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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Right to Injunctive Relief From Interlocutory Order of Administrative Body-Petitioner, producer of coal, filed
a confidential report on its business with the Bituminous Coal Commission,
pursuant to an order authorized by the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.1
The Act prohibited the disclosure of the information except as evidence in
a hearing under the Act.2 The Commission issued a ruling interpreting the
Act to permit the disclosure to interested parties in advance of a hearing
and gave notice of a proposed hearing. Petitioner filed a bill to enjoin the
disclosure of the confidential report as a violation of the Act and as a threatened irreparable injury to its business. The District Court denied the injunction on the ground that the disclosure would not violate the Act. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction to review a preliminary order, especially since the Act provided an exclusive appellate procedure; 3 also, on the ground that equity
will not enjoin administrative action involving an exercise of discretion in
a matter within the jurisdiction of the administrative body.4 Held, equity
has jurisdiction in injunction proceedings to review the ruling of the Commission because of the threatened damage and lack of any other remedy,
but the injunction is denied since the disclosure of the information is authorized by the Act.5 Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 6
U. S. L. WEEK 727 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
Although the denial of the injunction was affirmed, the Supreme Court
expressly disapproved of the theory of the Court of Appeals, criticized in
a previous issue of the REVIEW. 0 The instant case was held to be analogous to Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. R.,7 decided a month earlier, in
which the Supreme Court held' that the district court had jurisdiction to
review, for purposes of injunctive relief, a non-appealable order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Commission had ruled that a certain interurban railway came under the Railway Labor Act,8 and thereby
deprived it of the benefit of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 9 This ruling and its consequences under the Railway Act1 0
were held to constitute sufficient injury to justify an equity court in reviewing the order in injunctive proceedings. Therefore, it would seem
i. 5o STAT. 72 (1937), i5 U. S. C. A. § 828 et seq. (Supp. 1938). ". .
Commission may require reports from producers. . . ." Id. at 88, § 84oa.
2. "No information obtained from a producer . . . shall be made public

. the
ithout

the consent of the producer . . . except where such disclosure is made in evidence
in any hearing before the Commission. . . ." Ibid.
3. 50 STAT. 86 (1937), i5 U. S. C. A. § 836d (Supp. 1938) : "The jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of Appeals of United States or the United States Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia, as the case may be, to enforce, set aside or modify orders of
the Commission shall be exclusive."
4. 6 U. S. L. WE=c 493 (App. D. C. 1938).
5. Justice Black concurred in result only and felt that the theory of the Court of
Appeals was valid.
6. (1939) 87 U. op PA. L. REv. 475.
7. 59 Sup. Ct. i6o (1938).
8. 48 STAT. i85 (1935), 45 U. S. C. A. § i5i et seq. (Supp. 1938).
9. 49 STAT. 449 (1936), 29 U. S. C. A. § i5i et seq. (Supp. 1938).
io. The Act provided criminal penalties for disobedience and the petitioner had
been ordered to post notices that all disputes would be handled under the Railway Act.
The injunction was sought to prevent criminal prosecution for violation of this requirement See Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. R., 59 Sup. Ct. at 164 (1938).
(6og)
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that in the instant situation, the ruling of the administrative body although
not directly appealable 11 was a fortiori properly reviewable in injunction
proceedings because of the threatened irreparable injury.12
Constitutional Law-Private Utilities' Lack of Standing to Contest Constitutionality of the TVA-Several private utilities with nonexclusive franchises, serving the Tennessee Valley area, sued to enjoin the
TVA I from generating and distributing electricity on the grounds that no
power is granted to the federal government to do so, and that the proposed
plan would contravene the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. The
legislatures of the states where the TVA operates have impliedly authorized
its activities.2 Held (Justices Butler and McReynolds dissenting), that

the utilities, not having shown damage to a legally protected interest, have
3

no standing to contest the constitutionality of the act.
The Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 6 U. S. L. WEEK 713 (U. S. I939).
From a practical standpoint, little can be said in favor of thus avoiding the embarrassing question of whether the government's mammoth
power. project is constitutional. 4 Why it is that private utilities faced with
extermination by the government's activities may not contest the constitutionality of the enabling statute will be evident only to the most highly
trained legal minds.5 It is true that the instant decision is not in direct
conflict with existing case authority, but it is likewise true that a consideration of the merits of the constitutional issue was not precluded by any
previous decision. It is well settled that in the absence of an exclusive
franchise, a utility is not protected from subsequently authorized competition by a private 6 or public agency.7 Likewise, a competitor may not complain of ultra vires activities of a private 8 or municipal corporation.9

On

ii. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 99 F. (2d) 399 (App.

D. C. 1938), 87 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 475 (939).

12. The Court in the instant case found little difficulty in holding that the disclosure in advance of a hearing was authorized by the Act. Cf. (1939) 87 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 475.
I. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), as amended by 49 STAT. 1075 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831
(Supp. 1937).
2. For a summary of this state legislation, exempting TVA from regulation of
state commissions, empowering municipalities to buy electricity from TVA, etc., see
instant case at 715. On the possibility of a future attack on these provisions as a denial
of equal protection, see (939) 52 HIARv. L. REv. 686.
3. The 3-judge district court had considered the merits of the issue and had held
the TVA act constitutional under the commerce and national defense clauses. 21 F.
Supp. 947 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 667.
4. Cf. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938), where it was held that
private utilities had no standing to contest the constitutionality of Title II of the NIRA
under which Secretary Ickes was lending money to municipalities to duplicate petitioner's electricity distribution systems. That decision was expressly based on the fact
that the municipal competition was itself lawful.
5. Contrast the relatively small interest, from a realistic standpoint, of the shareholder permitted to attack the constitutionality of the Wilson Dam (originally authorized in 1915) in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 787.
6. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ii Pet. 42o (U. S. 1837).
7. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619 (934); 1 POND,
PUBLIC UTILITIES (4th ed. 1932) §§ 177-181, 191-192, 202-205, 210-212.

8. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, io5 U. S. 166 (1881).
9. See Keen v. Waycross, i Ga. 588, 591 (1897). This situation, where a city
enters into competition with private industry in violation of its charter is perhaps the
closest analogy to the instant case. However, in the state courts the problem is not
a vital one because the injured party can usually enjoin the unauthorized acts by means
of a taxpayer's suit, even though as a competitor he has no standing to complain. Id.
at 592; I POND, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 77-85.
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the other hand, coincident with the growing realization that competition
in the utility field is economically wasteful and socially undesirable, the
doctrine has arisen that where a statute requires utilities to obtain a certificate of public necessity and convenience, an authorized company may
sue to enjoin a competitor to whom no certificate has been validly issued. 10
This principle was followed by the Supreme Court in Frost v. Corporation
Commission 1 where it was held that an authorized company had a sufficient legal interest to enjoin a competitor whose certificate was issued under
a provision of a state statute which denied equal protection. The instant
Court dismissed that case rather briefly; but the distinction apparently
rested on the theory that the Frost case merely stands for the proposition
that an authorized company will be protected only from competition lacking valid authorization from the government which granted the petitioner
its franchise, and that the validity of the states' authorization of the TVA's
activities was not the object of attack in this suit.12 Thus, if the utilities
were merely objecting to the competition of the TVA, the Court's decision
is not contrary to established legal principle. However, the majority opinion did not meet adequately the complainant's contention that the government's activities were really a form of regulation of intra state utility rates
at a confiscatory level by the so-called "yardstick" method. 18 The national
government with unlimited resources and uncontrolled by the profit motive
is in a peculiar position to accomplish this end, and it was not dearly
explained why the party allegedly so regulated could not complain of such
an unconstitutional exercise of power. 14 Furthermore, it should be remembered that the utilities also pleaded a deprivation of property without due
process under the Fifth Amendment. If this point was properly pleaded,
it is difficult to see why the allegedly confiscatory rates indirectly enforced
by the TVA should not be subject to judicial review under the authority
of the rate cases. No direct authority has been found for this application
of the due process requirement,' 5 apparently the point was never raised in
connection with competition from municipally-owned plants. But it is odd
that the Court which previously has been so ready to detect disguised regulation'10 should have given this proposition so little consideration.
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Validity of State Sales Tax as to
Goods Shipped in Interstate Commerce-Sears, Roebuck & Co. contested the New York City 2 per cent. sales tax as applied to bulky goods
not stored in New York City. The order for these goods was given in
IO. I POND, op. cit. supranote 7, §§ 186, 9o1 et seq.; Hardman, The Changing Law
of Competition in Public Service (927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 219; Notes (1938) 51 HARv.
L. REv. 897, 899, (1926) 24 MICH. L. Rzv. 393.
i1. 278 U. S. 515 (i929).
12. Instant case at 715. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 484 (1938), aff'g, 9I F. (2d) 303, 306
(App. D. C. 1937) (see supra note 4), distinguished the Frost case on the basis that
there the competition was unlawful. Plainly this basis for distinction fails in the instant case.
13. Instant case, dissenting opinion, at 717.
14. Both the majority opinion and the opinion of the district court were obscure
on this point. See instant case at 7,5; instant case, lower court, 21 F. Supp. 947, 96o
(1938).
15. Cf. Georgia Power Co. v. TVA, i4 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N. D. Ga. 1936): "The
provisions of the section which authorize the TVA to make rules and regulations about
the distribution of power sold and rates for the resale of it go beyond the usual rights
of a seller, and may on proper challenge be found unreasonable in themselves or in their
exercise, but their failure would not nullify the entire act."
I6. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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the stores in New York City from samples on display and the price was
paid there but the goods were shipped direct from a factory or storehouse
outside New York state to the customer. Held, that the tax must be sustained since there is no interference with interstate commerce. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. McGoldrick, 18 N. E. (2d) 25 (N. Y. 1938).
In a second case, decided the same day by the same court, a foreign
shipping company contested the validity of the New York City sales tax
assessed on oil sold to it by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
The contract provided that the oil was to be delivered in barges to the
shipping company at its pier in New York harbor. The shipping company
at the time of making the contract understood that the oil was stored in
New Jersey and that there were no storage tanks in New York City.
Held (one justice dissenting), that the tax is invalid since it is a direct
tax on interstate commerce. Compagnie Generale Transatlantiquev. McGoldrick, 18 N. E. (2d) 28 (N. Y. 1938).
The problem presented by these two cases involves one phase of the
timely question of federal immunity from state taxation, a problem which
is further complicated by the fact that it invades the traditional sanctity of
interstate commerce.' Just when a sale becomes such an integral part of
interstate commerce that the court will exempt it from a state or city sales
tax has never been dearly settled. Nor has the problem been clarified by
an indiscriminate consideration of the property and use tax cases.2 Since
a sales tax is by definition a tax upon the sale of property, it should be of no
concern to the courts that the property sold is in transit or that it has come
to rest within a state; 3 the sole question to be decided is whether the tax
on the sale so interferes with interstate commerce as to be unconstitutional.
Thus, the instant court had few authoritative cases to guide it. The first,
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania,4 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1935, provides one vague point of departure, i. e., that a sales tax is not
an interference with interstate commerce unless the contracts "require or
necessarily involve transportation across the state boundary". In that case
the court concluded that it was not necessary to the fulfillment of the contract that the goods be shipped in interstate commerce in that the appropriation of the goods to the contract was entirely within the discretion of
the seller.' This point of view was accepted by the New York Court of
Appeals in National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor.6 The factual situation
there was distinguished from that of the Wiloil case on two grounds:
(I) that the contract was accepted outside the taxing state, and (2) that7
the goods required by the contract could not be procured within the state.
Thus, it was decided that the sale was in interstate commerce and the goods
tax exempt.
The transactions in the instant cases lie somewhere between those
of the Wiloil and the Cash Register cases. The decision in the Sears, Roebuck case points out that the purpose and object of the buyer was to proi. See Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 49.
2. These cases are cited by the instant court en masse. See 18 N. E. (2d) 25, 28.
3. This test enunciated in Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. I (1933), apparently
had some effect on the decision of the Wiloil case.
4- 294 U. S. 169 (I935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 795. For a general collection and
discussion of cases see Lockhart, Sales Tax in Interstate Commz~erce (1939) 52 HARv.
L. REv. 617.
5. Id. at 174. Cf. Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210 (1911).
6. 276 N. Y. 2o8, ii N. E. (2d) 881 (1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 433 (1938).
7. Id. at 214, 883. This case is apparently to be confined to its facts. See West
Publishing Co. v. Taylor, 276 N. Y. 535, 12 N. E. (2d) 565 (1937).
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cure the article irrespective of the place from which it was delivered, while
in the second case the court emphasizes the fact that the purchaser sought
and bargained for the oil in the oil company's tanks in New Jersey. Thus,
it is concluded that in the latter and not in the former case, the contract
necessarily involved transportation in interstate commerce. However, it
seems apparent from the facts of the first case that the purchaser was just
as much aware that his goods were to come from outside the state as in the
second case." Moreover, since the goods in the first case were goods which
could not be conveniently stored in New York City and must of necessity
be stored at an assembly plant, it would seem that Sears, Roebuck had no
more control over the source of the shipment than did the Standard Oil
Company. Consequently, it would seem to follow that the contract in the
first case was just as much involved in interstate commerce as that of the
second case. Certainly, there does not seem to be sufficient factual distinction to call for different results. Perhaps, the only deciding fadtor was
that it would be comparatively easy for Sears, Roebuck to evade the tax
by moving its goods to storehouses outside the state and thus work a
discrimination against local industry, while the cost of removing heavy
oil storage tanks would make such evasion too costly for the Standard
Oil Company." Yet, neither ease of evasion nor discrimination against
intrastate commerce has, of itself, been expressly recognized as a decisive
test for determining interference with interstate commerce.' 0 No matter
what distinction may be drawn to justify the almost contradictory results
of the two cases, they give rise to interesting speculation as to the point
at which the Supreme Court will limit the immunity of interstate commerce
from state and municipal sales taxes.
Constitutional Law-Validity of a State Statute Imposing as a
Prior Lien City Costs in Altering Tenements-The New York Multiple Dwelling Law I gives the Department of Housing and Buildings the
power to order alterations in old law tenements. The owner of the tenement is given the ,option to make the alterations at his own expense, or
permit the city to make them for him. Should the city be forced to alter
the building, the expenses become a lien upon the property prior to any
other encumbrances. 2 The plaintiff bank holds a first mortgage on premises
on which the Department intends to make alterations. The controversy
between the plaintiff and the City of New York, defendant, was submitted
to test the constitutionality of that section of the act providing for the prior
lien. Held, that the imposition of the prior lien is an impairment of the
obligation of the plaintiff's contract for a first lien in contravention of the
United States Constitution.' Central Savings Bank v. City of New York,
18 N. E. (2d) 151 (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1938).
8. The purchaser was given a sales slip stating that the merchandise is to be

shipped from a source outside the state direct to him. Sears Roebuck case at 27.

9. The court talks about evasion in the Sears Roebuck case at 27, but it would
seem that due to the nature of the goods, it would be difficult for Sears Roebuck to
move them to another place of storage since in many cases it would seem to require
removal of an entire factory. Id. at 26.
io. See (1938) 86 U. or PA. L. Rav. 433, 434, and citations in n. I.
i. N. Y. CoxsoL. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1929) c. 37-a.
2. N. Y. CoNsor LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1937) C.37-a, § 309, subd. 6, 1 (g).
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § IO. The same section of the act was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause on the grounds that no hearing as to
the reasonableness of the alterations and expenses was afforded the mortgagee. This
reason for the declared unconstitutionality of the act was recognized as the less irm-
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The most striking feature of the instant case is that the decision that
the statute's imposition of a prior lien was unconstitutional as a violation
of the "contract clause" was made without a discussion of the state's power
to make regulations conducive to public welfare even in apparent contravention of constitutional limitations. This disposition of the case suggests
a certainty in the premises which, it is submitted, does not exist. The
Supreme Court rather early discovered that a literal enforcement of the
contract clause would seriously hinder the states in their exercise of the
police power, it being a simple matter for persons to move themselves
beyond the reach of otherwise valid regulations by placing their intention
to act in the frame of a contract. 4 For this reason it was said that inherent
in the terms of every contract was the possibility of a future exercise of
the police power which might affect the rights created by the parties.5 All
that is necessary after there has been established occasion for the exercise
of the police power is that it be reasonably employed.8 In determining
when regulation is justified in the first instance, the courts have, as in the
case of litigation arising under the due process clause, adhered roughly to
the principle that any business "affected with the public interest" is particularly subject to state regulation. 7 Thus it is that a contract for utility
services might be rendered entirely nugatory by a subsequent regulation of
rates," or that a contract relating to the future conduct of a business peculiarly affected with the health, 9 safety,10 or morals 1 of the community might
be made entirely incapable of fulfillment by later legislation. It will be
noted that here substantial rights under contracts were affected and the
regulations were not considered unreasonable. In another class of cases,
not involving a business which can be thought to be "affected with the
public interest" but concerning only the rights of individuals under a conportant aspect of the case. Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 18 N. E. (2d),
151, 155 (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1938). Since this defect does not go to the essence of the
problem presented by the act and is easily cured by amendment, no further mention of
it is requisite.
4. Manigault v. Springs, i99 U. S. 473 (i9o3) ; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U. S. 349, 357 (9o8).
5. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654 (1872). "Not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society." Chief Justice Hughes in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 29o U. S.
398, 435 (1934).
6. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Marcus Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (192); Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934) ; Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U. S. 426 (1934).

7. See cases cited infra notes 8, 9, io and ii. It will be noted from a reading of
these cases that the Supreme Court has not used the words "affected with public interest" as their rationale in this field of constitutional law. Yet the actual decisions seem
definitely to point to an application of the spirit, if not the descriptive words, of the
principle that the state has peculiar powers over businesses which can be said to be
"affected with public interest". For a judicial recognition that this principle is appropriately employed in litigation under the contract clause, see Bucsi v. Longworth
Building & Loan Ass'n, ii9 N. J. L. 120, 94 AtI. 857 (1937). See also infra note io.
8. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S. 372 (1919). See
numerous cases cited (192o) 9 A. L. tM r423 et seq.

9. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Co., ii U. S. 746 (1884).
io. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57 (i898). Here the Court did
expressly recognize a distinction between contracts between private individuals and
"persons or corporations whose rights and powers were created for public purposes".
Id. at 72.
ii. Stone v. Mississippi, ioI U. S. 814 (1879).
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tract, the courts, although allowing legislative action affecting these rights,
restrict it to limited situations. 1 2 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,"' the leading case on one species of this class-the mortgage moratorium cases-held that there might be a justifiable exercise of the police
power if an emergency involving the public welfare exists, so long as the
exercise was reasonable. In the light of these principles, the situation of
the instant case seems definitely one in which the question of the police
power as affective of rights, assertedly protected under the contract clause,
might be pertinent. First, the business of conducting tenements is one
possible of falling within the category, "affected with public interest". 14
Second, were the tenement business not so considered, the legislation here
involved was passed to meet a housing emergency. 5 Thus a decision that
this legislation was constitutional could, on the grounds of argument, be
justified as an exercise of the police power. It should be recognized, however, that the courts must always cope with the principle that the exercise
of the police power, even where there is occasion for it, must be reasonable.16 Thus, the instant court may have felt that while some legislative
action might have been justified here, that embodied in the Act in question
in fact transcended the bounds of reasonableness. Granting that the imposition of a prior lien in the instant case is a drastic cutting down of the
mortgagee's rights under his contract, still, in view of the recent trend
toward favorable treatment by the Supreme Court of legislation designed
to solve the economic and social problems of the day and the obvious
uncertainty of the "reasonable" standard, the unconstitutionality of the instant legislation as a violation of the contract clause is not so clear as the
New York court seems to have deemed it.

Federal Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Federal District Court to
Enjoin Collection of State Tax-Action was brought in a federal district court to enjoin defendants from levying a retail sales tax on plaintiff
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The California Retail Sales
Tax Act ' stipulates that no injunction shall issue to prevent the collection
of the tax, but makes provision for payment under protest and suit at law
for refund.2 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Held, that payment under protest and suit for refund in the state
courts is not a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" under the Act of Congress of 1937,1 and therefore an injunction may issue from a federal district court. Printers& PublishersCorp. v. Corbett, 25 F. Supp. 369 (S. D.
12. See Note (1935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 2o.
13. 290 U. S. 398 (934).
14. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525, 526 (1934) and (1938) 87 U.

OF

PA. L. Ray. 129.

15. See the discussion of this legislation in the opinion of the New York Supreme
Court when the instant case was before it, 254 App. Div. 5o2, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 451
(1938).

16. See Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,

295

U. S. 56 (1935).

I. CALF. GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1933) Act 8493, as amended by CAIF.
1935) Act 8493.
2. Id. at §31.
3. "- • . no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend,
or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the

Gm. LAws (Deering, Supp.

laws of any State where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in
equity in the courts of such State." 5o STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938)
§4' (1).
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Calif. 1938). Contra: Nevada-CaliforniaElectric Corp. v. Corbett,4 22 F.
Supp. 951 (N. D. Calif. 1938).
A New York corporation, threatened with revocation of its Iowa sales
permit for refusal to pay taxes due under the Iowa Use Tax, brought action
in a federal district court to enjoin cancellation of the permit as being a
deprivation of property without due process of law. Held, that the court
has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction since an Iowa court can enjoin
the collection of an illegal tax, and therefore plaintiff has a "plain, speedy,
and efficient remedy" in the state courts. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. RoddewZig, 5 24 F. Supp. 321 (S. D. Iowa, 1938).
These cases are the first to be decided under the 1937 Act of Congress
restricting the jurisdiction of federal district courts to grant injunctions
against the collection of state taxes. Prior to the enactment of this amendment to the Judicial Code, an injunction could issue only if the remedy on
the law side of the federal courts was inadequate." By virtue of the recent
legislation the existence or non-existence of legal or equitable remedy in the
state courts, hitherto immaterial, is now the primary standard for determining jurisdiction. The Sears, Roebuck decision indicates that if the
state law permits an injunction against the enforcement of an allegedly
illegal tax, the federal district court will be relieved of jurisdiction to grant
an injunction. This result, clearly justified under the wording of the statute, effectuates the intention of the legislators by minimizing expensive
litigation in the federal courts,7 and enabling state
courts to construe the
8
statutes of their own states in the first instance.
Since the California statutes prohibited state courts from enjoining
collection of the taxes, the other two cases involved a consideration of the
sufficiency of the remedy afforded the taxpayer if forced to pay the tax
under protest and sue at law to recover the amount so paid. Prior to the
1937 Act it had been uniformly held that federal district courts were without jurisdiction to grant an injunction under such circumstances if a suit
at law could be brought in the federal courts, unless there were exceptional
circumstances which made such a remedy inadequate.9 In view of the
policy of Congress to restrict the granting of injunctions which enable large
foreign corporations to withhold taxes for long periods and thereby disrupt
state and local finances, 10 the right given by the California Acts to sue
4. This case involved the California Use Tax Act, CALn. GEN. LAws (Deering,
Supp. 1935) Act 8495a, as amended by CALIF. LAWs 1937, c. 683. The provisions of the
statute and other factual circumstances were substantially the same as those involved
in the Printers& Publishers case, which was decided eight days later.
5. The court also held that proceedings leading up to the cancellation of the permit
were proceedings to enforce the collection of the tax, and that therefore the statute was
applicable.
6. I MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrlcE (1938) 207, and cases cited therein.
7. 81 CONG. R Ec. 1416 (1937).
8. Cf. Notes (1935) 30 ILL. L. REV. 215, 216, (1936) 35 Micm. L. Rzv. 274, in con-

nection with the reasons for the enactment of the Johnson Act, 48 STAT. 775 (1934),
28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938) § 41 (1), delimiting the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts to enjoin the enforcement of orders of state administrative bodies "where a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had . . . in the courts of such State." The Act
of 1937 was modeled after the Johnson Act and virtually the same considerations led
to its enactment. See 81 CONG. REc. 1415 et seq. (1937). For a discussion of the desirability of prior determination of state statutes by state courts, see Lockwood, Maw and
Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction in ConstitutionalLitigation (1930) 43
HARV. L. R.. 426, 449, 450; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 769, 770.
9. Pepper, Enjoining the Collection of State and Local Taxes in the Federal Courts
(1936) 70 U. S. L. REv. 371, 372.
1o. 81 CONG. REc. 1416 (1937).

It is clear that the purpose of the Act was to restrict the granting of injunction by federal courts even where state statutes prohibited
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for the refund in the state courts would seem to be a sufficient remedy under
the 1937 Act of Congress unless the existence of very unusual circumstances
indicated that such a remedy would utterly fail to protect the taxpayer.
The statute appears to have been intended to prevent issuance of an injunction where a legal remedy may be had in the state court which, had it
existed in the federal district court prior to the enactment of the 1937 Act,
would have barred the issuance of an injunction. 1 In the Printers& Publishers case the court, without finding any extraordinary circumstances
which might justify the result,'12 decided that the plaintiff did not have a
"plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" in the California courts, and thereby
took a retrogressive step, inconsistent with the legislative purposes.' s The
more liberal view of the Nevada-Californiacase, wherein the court refused
to take jurisdiction, is to be preferred.
Insolvency--Participation by a Secured Creditor in the Distribution of an Insolvent Estate-Trust Company presented two claims
against decedent's insolvent estate. The first was a $20,00o demand note
secured by collateral worth $15,000 in which decedent had only one-half
of the beneficial interest. The second was a bond reduced by payments to
$48,90 and secured by a first mortgage on land, valued at $53,500, owned
by other parties. Held, that credit must be given on the first claim only
to the extent of decedent's one-half interest in the collateral; no credit need
be given on the second claim, since the security was owned by other parties.
Emlen!'s Estate, Appeal of Germantown Trust Co., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 5 (Pa. 1939).
state courts from issuing injunctions against the enforcement of the tax. Senator Bone,
while arguing on behalf of the bill which he had introduced, emphasized the situation
in the State of Washington where a statute divests the state courts of jurisdiction to
enjoin the collection of taxes unless the tax is invalid. Id. at 1415 et seq.
ii. See supra note io. If the federal district court may not issue an injunction
merely because the state courts are forbidden to, it would seem that the adequacy of
the legal remedy in the state courts is to be determined by the same standards as were
used to determine the adequacy of the remedy in the federal courts prior to the i937
Act.
The question of whether federal injunctive relief is still barred by the existence of
an adequate legal remedy in the federal courts, even where there is no sufficient remedy in the state courts, was not involved in the California cases because it had previously been decided that the California statutes required that the suit to recover the
money paid must be brought in a state court. Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 2o F. Supp.
940 (N. D. Calif. 1937).
12. The court referred to the financial embarrassment which would result to the

plaintiff if he were forced to pay the large tax, and also to the possibility of a multiplicity of suits arising out of the provision for quarterly payments of the tax, as factors
negativing the existence of a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy". Before 1937, the
fact that the payment of the tax would force the taxpayer into insolvency was judged
to make the remedy at law in the federal courts inadequate, Raymond v. Chicago Union
Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907) (note, however, that there were additional factors
present in this case) ; but the courts did not go so far as to permit mere financial hardship to take the case out of the general rule since that element is present in all cases
of this type. The contention that a multiplicity of suits would arise is unsound in view
of the provisions for joinder of causes of action in the California Code. See NevadaCaliforniacase, at 954. Furthermore it is extremely questionable whether there is such
multiplicity of action as to make the remedy at law inadequate where the taxpayer will
be obligated to bring repeated actions against the same defendant to obtain a refund.
See Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, supra note 8, at 436n; Pepper, supra note 9, at
378.
13. Analogy may be drawn to the action of the courts in giving a narrow construction to the "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" clause of the Johnson Act, thereby
threatening to nullify the effectiveness of the Act, see Legis. (1937) 5o HtAv. L.
REv. 813.
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Trust Company claimed against decedent's insolvent estate on a mortgage bond. The premises, valued at $I6,ooo, had been foreclosed during
decedent's lifetime and bought by claimant for $75. Held, that claimant
had no security upon the property of the debtor when rights in the insolvent
estate became fixed and therefore its claim should be allowed in full.
Emlen's Estate, Appeal of Land Title Bank & Trust Co., Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, P- I, col. 5 (Pa. 1939).'

Trust Company claimed against building and loan association, in possession of Secretary of Banking as receiver and solvent as to creditors but
insolvent as to shareholders, on a first mortgage extension agreement entered after association became owner by foreclosure of second mortgage.
The association later conveyed to a third party 2 and subsequently, during
the receivership, claimant foreclosed and bought the property, valued at
$5000, for $5o. Held, that without considering the question of insolvency,
the claimant had no security upon property owned by the association when
rights in the estate of the association became fixed and, therefore, its claim
should be allowed in full. In the Matter of All Wyoming Building and
Loan Association, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 5
(Pa. 1939).

First mortgagee claimed against building and loan association, in possession of Secretary of Banking as receiver and solvent as to creditors but
insolvent as to shareholders, on a first mortgage extension agreement entered when association was holder of second mortgage. Claimant had foreclosed its first mortgage and bought the property, valued at $390o, for $75,
prior to the time the association was taken over by the Secretary of Banking. Held, that without considering the question of insolvency, the claimant had no security upon property owned by the association when rights
in the estate of the association became fixed and, therefore, its claim should
be allowed in full. In the Matter of First Friday Building and Loan Association, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. i, col. 6 (Pa. 1939).
As was pointed out in an earlier issue of this REvIEw, 4 Pennsylvania
is now definitely committed to the Bankruptcy Rule 5 that in insolvency
proceedings a secured creditor must deduct the fair value of the security
he holds from the amount of his claim and prove for the balance, or else

i. The court on the same ground allowed in full a claim based on a mortgage bond
where the premises were not owned by the decedent at the time of foreclosure, having
been conveyed to a third party. The property, valued at $9000, was bought by claimant for $5o. Emlen's Estate, Appeal of Germantown Trust Co., Trustee, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 5 (Pa. 1939).

2. The exception of the claimant to the account of the Secretary of Banking
averred that the third party to whom the association conveyed the property was a
straw. Record, i5a. This exception was not introduced in evidence and strictly is not
part of the record on appeal, though the court could take cognizance of it.
3. The court reached the same conclusion on the somewhat similar facts of New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Brith Achim Building and Loan Association, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 5 (Pa. 1939).

There the association after fore-

closing its second mortgage entered an extension agreement with the first mortgagee
and later conveyed to a third party who was record owner when claimant foreclosed,
buying the property, valued at $3800, for $75. The association subsequently went into
voluntary liquidation on finding that it was solvent as to creditors but insolvent as to
shareholders.
Apparently the third party to whom the association conveyed the property was a
straw. See Appellant's Brief, p. 3.
4. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 98, 1022.
5. In In re Baker Deed of Trust, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I,

col. 6 (Pa. 1939), the court held, however, that the parties might by express agreement
invoke the Equity Rule whereby creditors could claim in full without having to deduct
the fair value of the security held by them.
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surrender his security to the estate and participate in the distribution as an
unsecured creditor. The instant cases present some refinements of that
rule not hitherto considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: must the
security be the property of the insolvent or may it be owned by third
parties; what is the effect on the claim where the security, even though
it did belong to the insolvent, is foreclosed before insolvency.6 Following
the position taken in United Security Trust Company Case 7 where "a
radical change of policy in the law" s was effected in the status of a secured
creditor, the court read into the applicable section of the Pennsylvania
Insolvency Act of ioi 9 the meaning and intent of Section 1 (23) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 10 and thus held it to be a sine qua non of the
Bankruptcy Rule that the security held by the creditor must be property
owned by the insolvent at the time of insolvency. The court reasoned that
since the legislative declaration of policy was that a creditor should have
the right to "surrender" his security to the estate, it could only have intended a giving up of title derived from the insolvent, i. e., the security
must have belonged to the insolvent. 1 It was felt that otherwise the problem would be complicated by introducing the question of subrogation. This
interpretation, logically consistent with the "legislative policy" announced
in United Security Trust Company Case, enables the creditor to be paid
twice where there is solvency as to creditors but an insolvency as to shareholders in the building and loan association cases. It would appear that
the limitation requiring ownership of the security by the insolvent was imposed unnecessarily since it seems clear that in at least three of the instant
cases 2 the Bankruptcy Rule, even as construed, is iniapplicable. In those
cases the debt upon which the creditor was claiming was an independent
6. Another problem presented is the type of insolvency which will invoke the application of the Bankruptcy Rule. The court did not discuss the fact that the building
and loan associations were solvent as to creditors but insolvent as to shareholders.
Other than an absolutist approach would indicate that this is a sufficient state of insolvency to invoke the rule. See Stone v. Schiller Building and Loan Association, 3o2 Pa.
544, 552, 153 AtI. 758, 76o (1931) ; Greater Adelphia Building and Loan Association v.
Trilling, 121 Pa. Super. 469, 471, x83 Atl. 651, 652 (1936) ; Blanarik v. Slavic ProSee also
gressive Beneficial Union, 123 Pa. Super. 4o5, 4o8, 187 At. 272, 274 (936).
BRAvm, L
DumATioN OF FiNANcrAL. INsTiTUOTs (1936) 1345.
7. 321 Pa. 276, 184 Atl. io6 (1936).
8. Id. at 285, 184 Atl. at iii.
any col9. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1930) it. 39, § go, provides that: ...
lateral security held by any creditor for his debt shall be valued by said tribunal, and
if the security be retained by the creditor his dividend shall be on the difference between his claim and the value of his security, so ascertained; Provided, That the
creditor shall have the right to surrender his security, and take a dividend on his
whole debt. If such creditor refuses to have his security valued or surrender the
same, he shall be excluded from participation in the fund." (Italics supplied.)
10. 30 STAT. 545 (1898),

11 U. S. C. A. § i (23)

(1927): "'secured creditor'

shall include a creditor who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under this act, or who owns such a debt for which
some indorser, surety or other persons secondarily liable for the bankrupt has such
security upon the bankrupt's assets . .

in
17

as
of

."

(Italics supplied.)

For a discussion of the fundamental differences between this provision and that
the Pennsylvania Insolvency Act of 19o, see Alexander's Estate, 31 Pa. D. & C.
(0. C. 1937).
ii. The court in thus scrupulously giving effect to the intent of the legislature
evidenced by this word necessarily rendered ineffective the no-less clear statement
intent relating to "any collateral security held by any creditor for his debt . . ."
12. In the Matter of All Wyoming Building and Loan Association, Phila. Legal

Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. i, col. 5 (Pa. x939) ; In the Matter of First Friday
Building and Loan Association, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. i, col. 6

(Pa. 1939); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brith Achim Building and Loan Association, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 5 (Pa. 1939).
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mortgage extension agreement, and for that debt no collateral security
whatsoever was held by the creditor.13 Moreover, in the All Wyoming
case, where the claimant foreclosed during the receivership of the association, the court imposed the restriction on the rule without deciding if the
condition precedent to the application of the Bankruptcy Rule,-insolvency,
-existed. This is likewise true in the First Friday case, where the foreclosure took place before the receivership.
Since the court adopted the Bankruptcy Rule as a fairer basis than
the Equity Rule for the distribution of insolvent estates,' 4 it is a tendency
productive of harshness to limit that rule, as was done here, by making
its application depend upon whether or not the creditor had foreclosed on
the collateral prior to insolvency. Such a distinction "would in effect be
penalizing a considerate mortgage creditor .

.

. ,

and be putting a pre-

mium on harsh, inconsiderate treatment of a debtor by a creditor who deserves no advantage." '5 Furthermore, it does not seem that the objectives of fairness and equality would sanction the extension of the rule that
the price realized at foreclosure is conclusive as to the value of the property
as between the mortgagor and mortgagee ' 6 to proceedings involving the
distribution of insolvent estates.
Conceding the inapplicability of the Bankruptcy Rule, the court could
have drawn on its inherent equity power 17 to evolve the rule that a secured
creditor, having also an insolvent's debt obligation, is only entitled to prove
a claim against the insolvent for the debt obligation, less the fair value
of the security. Thus the windfall to the creditors in the instant cases
could have been prevented. The results of these decisions undoubtedly
constitute an extension of the notorious "fifty dollar rule". The anomaly
of this is apparent when it is recalled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has labeled it "harsh",' has suggested legislative cures for its harshness,' 9
has three times declared unconstitutional attempted legislative cures, 0 yet
now extends its rigors.
Municipal Corporations-Power of Municipal Board to Bind Successors by Establishing Trust Fund-City sold its public school property to the state. To conserve the proceeds of the sale until the state operation of schools proved satisfactory, the funds were deposited in a bank
under a trust agreement for a period of fifteen years to be held for the
13. The evident purpose of the independent mortgage extension agreements was
to provide additional security for the claimant.
14. United Security Trust Co. Case, 321 Pa. 276, 184 At]. io6 (1936).
15. Alexander's Estate, 31 Pa. D. & C. 17, 29 (0. C. 1937).
16. This is the so-called "fifty dollar rule". See Beaver County Building and
Loan Association v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 49o n. 3, 187 Atl. 481, 484 n. 3 (1936);
Strauss v. W. H. Strauss & Co., Inc., 328 Pa. 72, 77, 194 Atl. 905, 9o8 (1937).
17. Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (933), 81 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 883; see Note (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 223, 226.
18. See Lomison v. Faust, 145 Pa. 8, 1I, 13, 23 Atl. 377, 378 (1892); White's
Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90, i85 AtI. 589, 591 (1936) ; Beaver County Building & Loan
Association v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 490, 187 Atl. 481, 484 (1936).
19. See Beaver County Building & Loan Association v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483,
508, 187 AtI. 481, 492 (936).
2o. The 1934 Mortgage Deficiency Act was declared unconstitutional in Beaver
County Building & Loan Association v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 Atl. 481 (1936),
85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 14. The 1935 Act was declared unconstitutional in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529, 198 Atl. 123 (1938). The 1937
Act was declared unconstitutional in Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 198
Atl. 115 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REy. 9oi. See generally Legis. (1938) 86 U. OF
PA. L. Rrv. 295.
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future needs of public schools and subject to withdrawal whenever considered necessary by the city for school needs. After the state schools had
proved satisfactory for nine years, the city and bank sought a declaratory
judgment that the trust could be terminated. Held (three justices dissenting),' that the trust could be terminated since the settlor was the
beneficiary and since the original city authorities could not deprive their
successors of the power to declare that the occasion for the waiting period
and the purpose of the trust had been fulfilled and that the trust should end.
First Nat. Bank of Anniston v. Jacksonville, 184 So. 338 (Fla. 1938). 2
Although professing that the law of private trusts was inapplicable,
the court nevertheless decided the issue in the instant case by ruling that
the power to terminate the declared trust, assuming its initial validity,
could not be denied the present municipal board by its predecessors in
office. If the issue were dealt with solely on the question of the termination of a trust, it would be difficult to justify the result reached in the
majority decision inasmuch as the trust declaration, as pointed out in the
dissenting opinion,2 established the general purposes of public school education as the beneficiary of a charitable trust 4 which was irrevocable in
the absence of an express reservation of a power to revoke.5 Thus the
decision that the present city authorities may not be denied the power to
revoke rests on a false assumption that the trust is revocable. However,
the more fundamental problem affects the initial validity of the trust declaration, since this involves the power of a municipal board to restrict its
successors to a pre-determined course of conduct. It is generally said that
such boards may, in the absence of contrary provisions in the city charter,
bind their successors in the exercise of a business or proprietary power,
while exercises of governmental or legislative powers are invalid if their
effect is to restrict subsequent boards. 6 Although an exact division between business and legislative powers cannot be made, courts appear to
decide that a business function is concerned when the transaction is of such
a nature that the returns which it provides the city will satisfy a reasonably forseeable and continuous need of the community. 7 On the other
I. The dissenting justices were of the opinion that there was created a charitable
trust which was interminable and that the present authorities could not deprive their
successors of the power to decide that there were school needs.
2.

".

.

. the case is not governed by the law of private trusts. .

.

."

Instant

case at 338.
3. Instant case at 341.
4. A trust for public school needs is clearly charitable: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) § 370. See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 70o, and cases
cited therein.
5. RESTATEmNT, TRUSTS (1935) § 367. Since the beneficiary of a charitable trust
may not be sui juris, the rules for termination of a private trust by consent of the
beneficiaries cannot apply. See 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 92o et seq.; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 364, 337, 338; Note (1938) 46 YALE L. J. 1005, 1017-1018. See
Re Birtwistle EI935] 0. R. 433, 13 CAN. B. R. 679 for a case denying the town council the power to terminate a charitable trust short of the expiration of the specified
term.
6. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 282 (C. C. A. 8th,
1896) ; McCormick v. Hanover Twp., 246 Pa. i69, 92 Atl. 195 (1914) ; 3 MCQUILLIn,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1356; Note (1931) 7o A. L. R. 794.
7. McBean v. Fresno, 112 Cal. i59, 44 Pac. 358 (1896) (sewage disposal);
Vincennes v. Citizens' Gaslight Co., 132 Ind. 114, 31 N. E. 573 (1892)

(gas or

water supply) ; Jacobberger v. School Dist., 122 Ore. 124, 256 Pac. 652 (1927) (employment of architect for whole building though only one wing constructed at time).
In this type of cases the reasonableness of the length of time successors are bound
is considered by the courts in the light of the circumstances in the particular case:
Garrison v. Chicago, Io Fed. Cas. No. 5,255 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1877) (ten years too
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hand, the transaction is void if a legislative power is obviously involved 8
or if no reasonably certain need of the community is thereby supplied.9 In
the instant case there would seem to be an invalid deprivation of legislative functions in the attempt of the previous board to strip its successors
of the power to determine that there was no further need for the segregation of the fund in question. 10 Thus the trust declaration was void, and
the fund is available to the present board because the attempted trust was
invalid." This approach to the problem eliminates the inconsistencies
arrived at by the court in holding that the present board could not be denied
the power to terminate a trust which would have been interminable if its
establishment had been valid.

Torts-Recovery for Shock Caused by Negligent Threat of
Injury to a Corpse-Defendant's tram car negligently collided with a
hearse displacing the coffin. Plaintiffs, the mother, uncle, and cousin of
the deceased, and the cousin's husband, sustained nervous shock upon witnessing the effects of the accident. Held, that each of the plaintiffs was
entitled to recover for the shock suffered notwithstanding the fact that
they were not themselves threatened by the tram car. Owens v. Liverpool
Corp., 55 T. L. R. 246 (Ct. of App. 1938) . 1
In view of the radical extension of tort liability imposed upon the defendant by the judges 2 in this case and the unqualified nature of their
holding, 8 it is pertinent to inquire into the elements necessary to impose
liability for negligent injury. The first of these is the establishing of a
duty of care. 4 It is said that this duty exists if the defendant should have
realized that his conduct created an unreasonable risk of invading the parlong) ; Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., 115 Me. 234, 98 Atl. 738 (1916) (unlimited) ;
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, lo7 Ohio St. 173, 14o N. E. 884 (1923) (statutory
limit).
8. City Council of Augusta v. Richmond County, 178 Ga. 400, x73 S. E. I4O
(1934) (cannot bind power to change rates to provide revenue) ; Westminster Water
Co. v. Westminster, 98 Md. 55I, 56 Atl. 99o (19o4) (cannot bind power to tax though
can bind to payment of set sum).
9. McCormick v. Hanover Twp., 246 Pa. 169, 92 At. 195 (1914) (employment
of counsel to begin after expiration of present board is invalid).
IO. On the other hand, money which is raised for a specific purpose and put in
a special fund may not be used for purposes other than that designated: Weik v. City
of Wasau, 143 Wis. 645, x28 N. W. 429 (191o); 5 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note
6, § 2337.

II. This does not lead to the conclusion that a governmental unit is without
power to set up a trust fund, except in those cases where the attempted trust involves
a binding of legislative powers of successors.
I. The trial court found that the hearse was damaged by defendant's negligence
and that the sight of this damage caused the injury but it ruled that there could be
no recovery unless the shock was the result of apprehension of injury to a human
being. 55 Law Times 246 (Ct. of App. 1938).
2. Mental distress cases have been treated as a separate field of tort law in which
it is generally held that there is no liability unless there is threat of injury to plaintiff's person. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts
(1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033.
3. See infra notes io and 12.

4. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928);
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTs (1926) 7.

Bo0ILE,
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ticular interest of the plaintiff for injury to which recovery is sought. 5
Plaintiffs in this case complained of an invasion of their physical security
directly resulting from defendant's negligence. But, it is submitted that
defendant was not negligent as to their physical security unless as a reasonably prudent man he should have foreseen some injury to this interest. 6
This, of course, is strictly a question of fact and not of law unless some
public policy or pressing necessity demands that an arbitrary standard of
care be set. 8 The Court of Appeals, however, reasoning from the rule
established inHambrook v. Stokes,9 decided as a matter of law that the
threatened injury to the corpse gave rise to a cause of action in the mourners for their physical injury." In the Hambrook case it was held, as a
matter of law, that recovery could be had for a mother's nervous shock
caused by fear for her child's safety when the mother herself was not
threatened by defendant's negligence.11 The effect of these decisions is to
hold, again as a matter of law, that negligence to the child is negligence
to the mother; that negligence to the corpse is negligence to the mourners.
If this be so, it is difficult to see why negligence to property is not negligence to the person of the owner or any one else who might have a sentimental interest in the object destroyed1 2 whether or not physical consequences could be foreseen. Thus the judicial tendency to reason logically
from one case to the next may lead to results utterly inconsistent with the
facts "I and the hitherto established policy of the law of negligence. If,
however, the matter of original negligence is submitted to the jury with
5.Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N. H. 198, i65 At!. 715 (933); Nuckles v. Tennessee
Elec. Pwr. Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775 (1927) ; Texas & P. R. R. v. Bigham,
go Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896) ; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W.
497 (1935); HARPm, TOaRTS (1933) §§7, 73; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §281,

Comments c and g. Cf. Rasmussen v. Benson, 28o N. W. 890 (Neb. 1938), 87 U. oF

P.A. L. REV. 245.
6.

7.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 284.
BOHLEN, supra note 4, at ii; GREN, JUDGE AND JuRy (1930) 26t; HAREm,
(1933) §77; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §285.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 285. See the statement of Cardozo, J.in WagInternational R. R., 232 N. Y. 176, i8o, 133 N. E. 437, 438 (1921), for a judi-

TORTS
8.
ner v.
cial expression of the extent of defendant's liability or "zone of foreseeable danger":
"The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable
as if he had".
9. (1925) I K. B. 141.
1O. "On principle we think that the right to recover damages for mental shock
caused by the negligence of a defendant is not limited to cases in which apprehension
of human safety is involved." Instant case at 247.
1i.Lord Justice Bankes thought that defendant might have anticipated the shock
in the mother arising from fear for her child. Hambrook v. Stokes, (1925) i K. B.
L41, 151. Lord Justice Atkin said: "If it were necessary, however, I should accept
the view that the duty extended to the duty to take care to avoid threatening personal injury to a child in such circumstances as to cause damage by shock to a parent
or guardian then present, and that the duty was owed to the parent or guardian." Id.
at 158. Lord Justice Sargant, dissenting, thought that "as defendant did not do
anything which could reasonably or naturally be expected to cause the harm in question to the plaintiff, there was no evidence of any breach of duty towards him for
which the defendant could be rendered liable". Id. at 163. These excerpts indicate
that the question of whether defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff was a factual
one which the majority of the court decided in favor of the plaintiff and the minority
in favor of defendant
12. The instant court intimates that recovery could be had for "real injury . . .
genuinely . . .caused by shock from apprehension of something less important than
human life (for example, the life of a beloved dog).. . . ". Instant case at 247.
13. Lord Justice Bankes wished

".

. . to confine my decision to cases where

the facts are indistinguishable in principle from the facts of the present case". Hambrook v. Stokes, (1925) I Y. B. 141, 152. It would seem that he was unsuccessful.
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instructions that defendant is only liable if he should be charged with knowledge that his conduct unduly threatened the plaintiff's bodily security because he should have anticipated either actual physical impact or that severe
mental strain which is likely to result in physical disorders, then the facts
and circumstances surrounding each case would be the factor determining
liability instead of a rigid rule of law.'14 It should be stressed more strongly
that the issue of original negligence is a matter of fact and not of law.
14. Thus in the instant case a jury might have been justified in finding that the
defendant should have known that physical shock might follow from interference with
the corpse. See Green, "Fright" Cases (1933) 27 ILL. L. REy. 873, for a good survey of the cases and concluding that they "should be treated as are cases involving
other physical injuries received through impact plus fright". Id. at 886.

